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INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF NARCOTICS
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I
INTRODUCTION
Narcotic drugs came into widespread use in western medical practice during the
latter part of the nineteenth century. They had, in their crude form, been known
for their so-called beneficial effects for centuries and had been extensively used, both
therapeutically and nontherapeutically, for their calming, intoxicating, and presumed
curative properties. Their introduction, however, shortly led to their abuse, and it
soon became necessary to try to limit their availability. Accordingly, control mech-
anisms were early established in most western countries, whose prime objective was
the prevention of individual access to these drugs, except by medical prescription.
The imperative demand for drugs by the addict and the impossibility of its satis-
faction through legitimate channels, however, encouraged the growth of an extensive
and lucrative illicit traffic; and if drugs could not thus be obtained domestically, they
were procured in foreign countries where control was either nonexistent or less
effective. As a result, even the most effective national control was rendered largely
nugatory, and the campaign against narcotics abuse came to be recognized as a truly
international problem.
It was, in fact, the opium-smoking habit in China that led Theodore Roosevelt,
in 19o8, to summon to Shanghai the first international gathering for the purpose of
planning concerted government action against the abuse of narcotic drugs. It was
not, strictly speaking, an international conference, but rather a commission to dis-
cuss the problem and recommend possible solutions; and its membership was com-
prised of those governments within whose far eastern territories opium smoking
was a problem. This commission proceeded to lay the groundwork for the first
international drug conference, which was held at The Hague and which concluded
the first international instrument in this field, generally referred to as The Hague
International Opium Convention of 1912.
This convention did not, unfortunately, meet with immediate success; signatures
and ratifications were slow in forthcoming before World War I supervened in 1914
and halted all progress. The experience was, in fact, so disappointing, that at the
war's conclusion, the victorious powers decided vigorously to underwrite the inter-
national campaign against narcotic drug abuse. To this end, two steps were taken:
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First, an article inserted in all the peace treaties (e.g., article 295 of the Treaty
of Versailles with Germany) provided that ratification of the peace treaties "should
be deemed in all respects equivalent to ratification of ... [The Hague] Convention,"
and further pledged the signatory powers to its enforcement. Secondly, the following
article was inserted in the League of Nations Covenant, entrusting to the League the
international control of narcotic drugs:
Subject to, and in accordance with the provisions of international conventions existing
or hereafter to be agreed upon, the members of the League . . . (c) will entrust the
League with the general supervision of the execution of agreements with regard to...
the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs.
During the lifetime of the League, a number of additional international instru-
ments, designed to mitigate the narcotic drug problem, were drawn up and put into
execution. These were:
I. the International Opium Convention of 1925, which sought principally to regu-
late international trade and which created the first international organ to supervise
and control the application of the convention, the Permanent Central Opium Board;
2. the Convention of July 13, i93i, for limiting the manufacture and regulating
the distribution of narcotic drugs;
3. the Convention of 1936, for suppressing the illicit traffic in dangerous drugs; and
4. the Opium Agreements of 1925 (Geneva) and of 1931 (Bangkok), for gradually
suppressing opium smoking.
Moreover, in 1940, the Opium Advisory Committee of the League had prepared a
draft convention for the limitation of poppy cultivation and the production of raw
opium. World War II, however, impeded the translation of this draft into an
international convention, and it was abandoned as a basis for further action on this
subject by the United Nations, which succeeded the League in this area in 1946.
In its first ten years, the United Nations has had three new international narcotic
drug instruments to its credit. The first was the 1946 protocol on narcotic drugs
(Lake Success), by which the League conventions were adapted to the new world
organization-i.e., references to League bodies and organs were replaced by those
of the United Nations. Second, came the protocol of 1948 (Paris), bringing under
international control narcotic drugs without the scope of the 1931 limitation con-
vention-mainly synthetic drugs that had not been discovered or in use in I931.
Third, there was the protocol of 1953 (New York) for limiting and regulating the
cultivation of the poppy plant and the production of, international and wholesale
trade in, and use of opium. This last instrument, it should be noted, however, has
not yet received the number of ratifications required for its entry into force.
This, then, is the legal structure that governs the international campaign against
narcotic drug abuse. It may also be mentioned that the Commission on Narcotic
Drugs of the United Nations at present is engaged in drafting a single convention
to replace all these existing international narcotic drug instruments, designed to
codify, simplify, and strengthen the present system of international control.
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II
THE PATrERN OF CONTROL
The objectives of international control can be stated very simply: to prevent the
abuse of narcotic drugs, while assuring their continued availability for medical and
scientific purposes. To achieve these objectives, the international narcotic drug
instruments not only prescribe rules in the international field, but also define the
measures of control to be maintained within each country. These two sets of rules
are, of course, closely interrelated and mutually interdependent. Thus, effective
national control serves not only to prevent abuse at home, but also to protect other
countries by stopping the leakage of narcotic drugs into illicit international channels.
Again, effective enforcement of all international rules depends on the vigorous
cooperation of individual national governments, albeit subject to supervision and
control by international organs. In short, there are manifested in these rules the
complementary functions of self-protection and the protection of other peoples of the
world.
At the outset, it should be observed that these rules were formulated empirically.
In 1912, when the first narcotic drug control instrument was drafted, international
cooperation, in general, was in its infancy, and it was then, as later, necessary to
proceed slowly, step by step. Experience in the area was either completely lacking
or insufficient; there was inadequate technical, medical, and social knowledge of
the nature of the problem; and there was no accurate information as to either the
extent of the evil or the appropriate measures to combat it. Furthermore, progress
in international cooperation has been, necessarily, limited by the agreement of gov-
ernments; and, accordingly, international legislation, for its widest and most effective
appeal, has been forced to seek the most common denominator. In this light,-what
is the nature and scope of the control mechanisms that have evolved?
A. Internal National Control
The rule here is very simple. Narcotic drugs in whatever form, either raw, semi-
manufactured, or "wholly manufactured and prepared for use, may be handled only
by persons or firms licensed for that purpose by competent authorities, and these
narcotic drugs may only be purchased for consumption under proper medical pre-
scription. Those authorized to deal with narcotic drugs are required to keep verified
accounts of all transactions, and these accounts are subject to regular or ad hoc exam-
ination by government inspectors. Physicians, hospitals, and licensed pharmacists,
of course, may keep and dispense narcotic drugs without special authorization, but
records must be kept and filled prescriptions preserved, subject to inspection. Nar-
cotic drug manufacture may take place only on premises specially licensed for the
purpose, and governments are obligated to exercise a strict supervision over factories,
narcotic drugs manufactured, and their disposal. Stocks of raw materials in
factories may not exceed six months' or, in special circumstances and with special
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authorization, twelve months' requirements. Manufacturers must submit quarterly
reports giving a full account of their business, including stocks of raw materials and
manufactured drugs on hand at the end of each quarter, to be verified by govern-
ment inspectors during periodic visits to the factory. Supplies of manufactured
narcotic drugs available in each country are limited annually through the operation
of the estimates system established by the 1931 convention, the main features of which
will be dealt with below. There is, however, no corresponding limitation of raw
materials, except that mentioned in regard to supplies in factories, although, if the
1953 opium protocol comes into force, there will be limitations on the quantities of
raw opium available in each country. Nevertheless, many governments, in enacting
narcotic drug legislation, have applied to raw materials the same control measures
and restrictions as to manufactured products.
B. Control of International Trade
At the end of World War I, the international trade in narcotic drugs was the
main source of supply for the illicit traffic. Governments in western countries had
national control well in hand, but the export and import of raw materials and man-
ufactured drugs were, in general, unrestricted, and they circulated across frontiers
and oceans, unhindered, in practically unlimited quantities. In the i92o's, this
burgeoning international trade began to cause great anxiety, and the League of
Nations, therefore, addressed itself directly to this problem. Under its aegis, the
1925 convention established a rigid control system, which, in due time, became very
effective and which still works well today. Since the success of any international
system depends upon the cooperation of the governments that are parties to it, how-
ever, this convention, not surprisingly, did not become fully effective immediately,
owing to the relatively large number of governments that did not bind themselves
to it until a later stage. This untoward situation did, nevertheless, produce an
unlooked-for dividend, in that it brought home to the world the fact that success in
the campaign against narcotic drugs was only possible on a universal basis-i.e., with
the cooperation of all governments and by their acceptance of all obligations under
the conventions.
Pursuant to the 1925 convention, the international trade is supervised and con-
trolled by the import certificate and export authorization system. The underlying
principle is that in as much as narcotic drugs are dangerous substances, no govern-
ment may authorize their export to another country without the express consent of
the government of that country. This latter must take the form of a certificate
stating that the import of specified kinds and quantities of narcotic drugs is author-
ized and that they are required for legitimate purposes (in the case of raw opium
and coca leaves) or solely for medical and scientific purposes (in the case of manu-
factured narcotic drugs and Indian hemp, or cannabis). The authorization to export
narcotic drugs may not be granted until the exporter has submitted to the govern-
ment such an import certificate issued by the competent authorities of the government
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of the country of destination, and when granted, the authorization must state the
number, date, and issuing authority of the import certificate. One copy of the
export authorization must accompany the consignment; another must be sent to the
appropriate authority of the importing country, which must return its copy to the
exporting country when the import has occurred or the time limit for the importa-
tion has expired, showing the quantities of narcotic drugs actually imported, if any.
Shipments in transit are controlled by the accompanying export authorization and
may not be diverted to another destination without a special diversion certificate
issued by the exporting country, plus an import certificate from the country to which
the shipment -is to be diverted. Control of the international trade extends to free
ports and free zones in accordance with special provisions. Adherence to these
fundamental requirements in international trade is assured by the close supervision
of one of the international agencies, the Permanent Central Opium Board, to which
each party to the 1925 convention must send its quarterly statistics of imports and
exports, indicating the country of origin or of destination, as the case may be.
C. International Limitation of Manufacture
It soon became apparent, however, that effective control of narcotic drugs de-
manded that the supply of drugs be geared to the world's requirements for medical
and scientific purposes, since any excess tended to find its way into the illicit traffic.
World manufacture had to be limited to legitimate needs, and a proposal to this
effect was advanced by the United States of America at the 1925 opium conference.
When the majority of the participating states refused to entertain this proposal
because the matter had not been included in the conference agenda, the United
States delegation withdrew and refused to become a party to the convention. The
Opium Advisory Committee of the League of Nations took up the matter where the
1925 conference had left it, however, and prepared a draft limitation convention that
was substantially adopted in 1931 by an international conference that met in Geneva.
This convention marked a great step forward and signalized a substantial and bold
advance in international law and international cooperation.
The guiding principle of limitation of manufacture, as embodied in the 1931 con-
vention, is that each country may have at its disposal only the amount of narcotic
drugs that it requires for medical and scientific purposes, and that no more drugs may
be manufactured than are required to satisfy the legitimate needs of the world.
To achieve this goal, the convention binds the parties to determine their requirements
for the coming year through the so-called annual estimates, which are then submitted
to a special international body set up by the 1931 convention, the Drug Supervisory
Body, with an explanation of the methods used in their calculation. After examina-
tion, the Body establishes the totals of the estimates for each country and territory,
which it then publishes in its annual statement of world requirements of narcotic
drugs. This is the basic document for limitation of manufacture and use, since the
estimates, as set forth therein, are binding on governments and may not be exceeded.
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The convention provides for the possibility of submitting supplementary estimates, if
necessary, however, during the course of the year, but governments must explain
the circumstances which necessitate the additional quantities. These supplementary
estimates, which may, incidentally, be negative, are dealt with by the Body in
exactly the same manner as annual estimates, and they are published in supplements
to the annual statement.
The Drug Supervisory Body may, except as regards requirements for govern-
ment purposes, request further information and explanations regarding estimates,
but can amend them only with the consent of the government concerned. In case
of disagreement between a government and the Body, the latter has no means of
action other than publicity, which, however, can be and usually is sufficiently effective.
The convention permits the Body to publish in its statements an account of the
correspondence or discussions with the government, together with its own observa-
tions; and this subtle weapon, or the bare possibility of its use, has been adequate
to achieve the purpose of the estimates system-namely, correct and reasonable esti-
mates and the consequent limitation of narcotic drug manufacture and use to the
world's medical and scientific needs.
It is obvious that the estimates system, and, therefore, limitation of narcotic drug
manufacture and use, can only operate effectively if it is universally applied. With
this in mind, the 1931 conference sought to provide for governments that would not
become parties to the convention and those that would fail to furnish the prescribed
estimates. Provisions were, accordingly, inserted in the convention, instructing the
Permanent Central Opium Board to request estimates from nonparties to the con-
vention, and the Drug Supervisory Body was given the duty to furnish, itself, esti-
mates so far as possible, if governments, whether or not parties to the convention,
failed to do so. The Body has performed this function in innumerable instances,
relying on statistics from the past and on other information at its disposal. If a
government is dissatisfied with the estimates furnished for it by the Body, it always
has the means available to remedy the situation by furnishing supplementary esti-
mates. Estimates established by the Body have the same force and validity as those
furnished by governments themselves. They cannot, of course, bind governments
that are not parties to the convention (nor, indeed, can government-furnished esti-
mates), but parties to the convention are bound to observe them in their com-
mercial relations with parties and nonparties alike.
If narcotic drug use or manufacture exceed estimates examined and published
by the Drug Supervisory Body, the simplest remedies are the furnishing of supple-
mentary estimates or the deduction of the excess from the estimates for the following
year. Failing either of these remedies, a violation of the convention has occurred and
may result in the invocation of sanctions against the violator, as specified in the
provisions regulating the supervision by the Permanent Central Opium Board, dealt
with in greater detail below. In consequence, perhaps, the estimates system and the
provisions for limitation of manufacture and use, which have been in operation for
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over twenty years (from January i, 1934), have produced excellent results. In a few
years, world manufacture was brought down very close to medical and scientific
requirements. On occasions, manufacture has not even met those requirements, and
it has been necessary to supply the deficit from stocks.
III
NARconc SUBSTANCES UNDER CONTROL
Generally speaking, all substances which have recognized addiction-producing
properties are subject to international control, to a greater or lesser extent. At present,
there are four groups of substances which are considered narcotic and which, accord-
ingly, are under general national and international control:
i. opium and its derivatives-i.e., morphine, diocetylmorphine (heroin), codeine,
and dionine;
2. coca leaves, ecgonine, and its derivative, cocaine;
3. Indian hemp drugs (marijuana), now officially referred to as cannabis drugs;
and
4- synthetic narcotic drugs, which are manufactured by synthesis and capable of
producing addiction, but are not obtained directly from raw materials produced by
nature, such as opium, coca leaves, or the cannabis plant.
Despite several attempts (particularly during the I93i conference), it has never
been possible to arrive at a universally satisfactory definition of narcotic drugs or
substances. International legislation has, therefore, resorted to the system of enu-
merating the substances or groups of substances to be controlled. In the early days,
narcotics were described as dangerous substances or drugs, as dangerous habit-forming
drugs, or as drugs capable of causing addiction. In some cases, as in the 1936
convention, which, in its tile, uses the words "dangerous drugs," reference is simply
made to the drugs and substances to which the provisions of the previous conventions
apply. And in others, as in the protocol of 1948, reference is made to drugs which
are susceptible to the same kind of abuse and are productive of the same kind of
harmful effects as those covered by the 1931 convention.
The conventions, of course, obviously had to include provisions to insure inter-
national control of additional narcotic drugs not already specifically covered. To
this end, therefore, complicated procedures were devised which involve recommenda-
tions or decisions by the World Health Organization, assisted by expert bodies.
Illustrative are article io of the 1925 convention, which refers to any narcotic drug
liable to similar abuse and productive of similar ill effects as the substances already
falling under the convention; and article ii of the 1931 convention, which refers to
any new product obtained from any of the phenanthrene alkaloids of opium or from
the ecgonine alkaloids of the coca leaf. The I931 convention is, thus, more limited,
but as both conventions are in force, the provisions of either can be invoked. The
decisions of the World Health Organization in this context, under the i925 con-
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vention, it should be noted, are only recommendations which parties may or may not
accept; those under the 1931 convention and under the 1948 protocol, however, are
binding on the parties.
The 1948 protocol, incidentally, had to provide a special procedure, as it was
intended to extend to any narcotic drugs not otherwise under international control.
It leaves the initiative with the governments, through notifications to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations. The World Health Organization then has to decide
whether the substance in question is capable of producing addiction or of conversion
into such a product. If the decision is affirmative, parties to the protocol are bound
to apply the appropriate provisions of the 1931 convention. Pending the decision
of the World Health Organization, however, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs of
the United Nations has the power to decide, with binding effect for the parties, that
the controls of the 1931 convention shall be applied provisionally. The procedures
for bringing additional narcotic drugs under international control are lengthy and
cumbersome, since it may require a year or more for the World Health Organization
to make the investigations and experiments necessary to its decisions. It is for this
reason that both the 1931 convention and the 1948 protocol contain rules for temporary
control measures pending final decisions.
IV
THE PRINCIPAL ORGANS OF CONTROL
International supervision today derives its authority partly from the Charter of
the United Nations and the decisions of its Economic and Social Council, but mainly
from the international conventions and agreements. The supervision is exercised
through a number of different organs, of varying composition and function.
A. The Commission on Narcotic Drugs
The United Nations Charter makes no specific reference to narcotic drugs, but
these fall under the provisions for international cooperation in solving problems of
an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, referred to in article i, para-
graph 3 of the Charter. By virtue of this wide competence, the Economic and Social
Council, in February 1946, moved to take over narcotic drug control from the
League of Nations by establishing its Commission on Narcotic Drugs. The resolu-
tion which contains the terms of reference and defines the competence of this
commission reads as follows:
Commission on Narcotic Drugs
I. The Economic and Social Council, in order to provide machinery whereby full effect
may be given to the international conventions relating to narcotic drugs, and to provide
for continuous review of and progress in the international control of such drugs,
Establishes a Commission on Narcotic Drugs.
2. The Commission shall:
(a) assist the Council in exercising such powers of supervision over the application
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of international conventions and agreements dealing with narcotic drugs as may be
assumed by or conferred on the Council;
(b) carry out such functions entrusted to the League of Nations Advisory Committee on
Traffic in Opium and other Dangerous Drugs by the international conventions in narcotic
drugs as the Council may find necessary to assume and continue;
(c) advise the Council on all matters pertaining to the control of narcotic drugs, and
prepare such draft international conventions as may be necessary;
(d) consider what changes may be required in the existing machinery for the international
control of narcotic drugs and submit proposals thereon to the Council;
(e) perform such other functions relating to narcotic drugs as the Council may direct.
3. The Commission may make recommendations to the Council concerning any sub-
commission which it considers should be established.
4. The Commission shall be composed of fifteen Members of the United Nations, which
are important producing or manufacturing countries or countries in which illicit traffic
in narcotic drugs constitutes a serious social problem. The term of office of members is
three years. They are eligible for re-appointment.
5. The Commission is authorized by the Council to appoint in a consultative capacity,
and without the right to vote, representatives of bodies created under the terms of inter-
national conventions on narcotic drugs.
6. The Council requests the following Governments to designate one representative each
to constitute the Commission:
Canada Peru
China Poland
Egypt Turkey
France United Kingdom
India United States of America
Iran Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Mexico Yugoslavia
Netherlands
It will be seen that the competence of the Commission is very extensive and relates
to the past, present, and future, but the Commission, like its predecessor, the Opium
Advisory Committee of the League of Nations, is, in general, an advisory organ
to the Economic and Social Council. In principle, therefore, its decisions are subject
to confirmation or approval by the Council, except in cases where the Commission has
been given specific functions by the conventions. The single convention, as presently
drafted, may confer on the proposed International Narcotics Control Board a series
of independent functions not subject to the review or approval of the Council, but
this, of course, is a matter for the future.
By means of an extensive system of informational exchanges and reports, the
Commission on Narcotic Drugs is constantly kept in touch with situations as they
develop and can take timely remedial measures when required. More specifically,
the conventions impose on governments the obligation of transmitting to the Secretary
General the following series of reports and information:
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I. Laws and Regulations
All conventions, from I912 Up to and including the 1953 protocol, provide that the
parties shall communicate to one another, through the Secretary General, the text
of laws and regulations promulgated to give effect to the conventions. These docu-
ments are translated by the United Nations Secretariat as and when necessary and
circulated to governments and to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs. The Narcotics
Division of the secretariat also has annually submitted to the Commission a summary
of these laws and regulations, making it possible for both governments and the
Commission to follow legislative developments without any reference to long and
complicated texts. At its last session (x956), the Commission abolished this annual
summary and decided that it should only be produced every five years. There will,
however, be an annual cumulative index, an annual tabulation of changes in the
scope of control, and, as the need arises, analyses or studies of particular aspects of
control. These decisions were taken under the impact of a resolution by the Eco-
nomic and Social Council concerning the reduction of the United Nations documents
in general. The wisdom of abolishing the annual summary is, however, questionable.
2. Annual Reports
The system of annual reports was instituted at an early date by the League of
Nations and was made an obligation through the 1931 convention. In fact, annual
reports are also provided for in the subsequent conventions and the 1953 protocol.
In the terms of the 1931 convention, parties shall forward to the Secretary General
an annual report on the working of the convention in their territories, in accordance
with a form drawn up by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs. This form is very
elaborate and covers all aspects of narcotic drug control, illicit traffic, and addiction.
The annual reports received are analyzed by the secretariat and incorporated in an
annual summary, which is discussed in detail by the Commission. These reports
afford an excellent means by which both governments and the Commission may fol-
low developments all over the world and discuss and try to remedy weaknesses and
gaps in international narcotic drug control.
3. Reports on Cases of Illicit Traffic
The Opium Advisory Committee of the League of Nations, in the early days,
had already asked governments to transmit, for examination, reports on significant
cases of illicit traffic, and the 1931 convention gave a treaty basis to this practice.
Article 23 of this convention requires the parties to communicate to each other,
through the Secretary General, as soon as possible, particulars of illicit traffic which
may be of importance either because of the quantities involved or because of the light
thrown on the sources or on the methods employed by the traffickers. These reports
are periodically communicated to governments in summarized form and form the
basis of the discussions on illicit traffic by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs.
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4. Reports on Manufacturing Industries
Article 20 of the 1931 convention made it a binding obligation upon governments
to inform each other, through the Secretary General, of all establishments authorized
to manufacture narcotic drugs, a practice that had already been established by the
Opium Advisory Committee of the League. Detailed information must be supplied,
with names, addresses, kinds of narcotic drugs manufactured or converted, as well
as any changes in the authorization or cessation of manufacture. The information
thus received by the Secretary General is communicated periodically to both govern-
ments and the Commission on Narcotic Drugs in the so-called list of drug factories.
5. Reports on Authorities to Issue Import Certificates and Export luthorizations
In order that the system of import certificates and export authorizations may func-
tion satisfactorily and in order to avoid fraud, it is necessary that the names of the
authorities issuing these documents be known. For national control, it is essential
that only one central authority issue these documents. Governments are required
to furnish this information in their annual reports, and the secretariat of the United
Nations publishes periodically a list of these authorities.
When the United Nations appointed its technical or functional commissions,
it decided to keep them small in order to save time and make them work as
efficiently as possible. Furthermore, states not members of the United Nations were
excluded. By way of contrast, at least in regard to narcotic drugs, the League of
Nations adopted a different philosophy, arguing that any state, whether or not a
member of the League, which so desired, should be permitted to participate in the
work of the Opium Advisory Committee. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Com-
mittee had no less than twenty-five members. The Commission on Narcotic Drugs
has felt increasingly the need for cooperation with unrepresented states, however, and
has, accordingly developed a system of inviting such states to assist it at its sessions
as observers who may not vote, but who may take part in the deliberations. States
may also send observers to the meetings without an invitation. This system has
developed to such an extent that at the eleventh session (1956), not less than seventeen
states had either been invited to attend or attended as observers, in general or for
specific questions. This would seem to indicate that the membership of the Com-
mission is too restricted. Moreover, continuity and technical knowledge are of
paramount importance and can only be guaranteed by a more or less permanent
participation in the work. The Commission should, of course, also have adequate
geographic representation for the various regions of the world, and this is hardly the
case today when only two Latin American states out of twenty are represented, and
the Far East and Africa have only one representative each.
With respect to working methods, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs has not,
so far, developed a system of working through permanent or ad hoc subcommittees.
or of using its own experts. Following the League precedent, however, there has
been, for the past two years, a permanent subcommittee on the illicit traffic that
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meets for a few days before each session of the Commission and submits a considered
report to the Commission itself. The Opium Advisory Committee of the League, on
the other hand, had a number of permanent subcommittees (e.g., agenda, illicit
traffic, cannabis, limitation of opium production, and list of drugs falling under the
conventions) as well as a staff of permanent experts on specific subjects (e.g., illicit
traffic, cannabis, and limitation of opium production) called assessors.
Preparation of questions by small subcommittees would insure a more focused
application of expert knowledge to all aspects of a problem, and, above all, it would
facilitate and shorten the discussions of the Commission itself. It also would tend
-and this is important-to eliminate excessive influence on decisions in technical
fields by political and other sometimes irrelevant considerations. Experience has
proved that a commission in plenary session is, on the whole, likely to accept the
agreed conclusions arrived at by its subcommittee, and as subcommittees meet in
private, there is a much freer exchange of views and opinions than is possible in
public meetings.
The Commission on Narcotic Drugs has, on occasions, had recourse to experts,
but these have usually been experts of other international organizations, such as the
Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Health Organization. A typical
instance of this were the inquiries regarding cannabis, which were initiated by the
Commission and carried out by the Food and Agriculture Organization. It is, of
course, quite logical to apply to other international organizations for expert assistance
within their special competences, but this procedure has two distinct drawbacks.
First, the other organizations have their own work to consider and usually have
neither the funds nor the personnel to devote to what might be called outside work.
Secondly, these organizations cannot possibly possess the general and specific knowl-
edge of the narcotic drug problem which is indispensable in technical inquiries. The
secretariat of the Commission naturally insures planning and coordination, but its
influence is limited. Better and quicker results would be obtained if the experts
worked directly under and for the Commission, at its expense.
With its present composition and working methods, the Commission on Narcotic
Drugs makes but slow progress-in fact, too slow. It spent years on a draft con-
vention for limiting raw opium production, only to discard the whole draft in 1952
and substitute for it a draft which later became the 1953 protocol. The single con-
vention has been under elaboration for over six years, and is not yet anywhere near
the final stage-a situation at least partly owing to the Commission's lack of both
effective subcommittees and its own qualified experts.
But even apart from the slowness of its progress, further developments of the
Commission on Narcotic Drugs are seriously hampered by the fact that political
considerations play such a large role in its work. This may, to some extent, be
attributable to the uneasy international situation as a whole, but it is obvious that
there is not, in the Commission, the same concern with the general interests of hu-
manity that existed in the Opium Advisory Committee of the League. In the League,
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the work after the first few years was entirely motivated by technical and humani-
tarian considerations; today, national economic interests make themselves felt, and
the political cleavage between West and East exercises considerable influence. Illustra-
tive is the way in which the Commission, at its 1956 session, dealt with the situation
on the mainland of China. In previous years, there had been long and serious dis-
cussions of the notorious fact that the mainland of China is the largest producer of
opium in the world (all illegal production) and that heroin and morphine manu-
factured therefrom in large quantities find their way into the illicit traffic in the Far
East and thence to the West. At the 1956 session, however, the representative of the
United States did not furnish the detailed information about the situation that he
had given in previous years, and the Commission's report deals with the situation very
lightly and almost incidentally. It was also apparent that the representatives of
certain other governments had been instructed not to enter into any serious dis-
cussions of the situation and not to level accusations against the Peoples Democratic
Republic of China. Whatever the political considerations might have been, however,
they should not have been allowed to interfere with the campaign of the Commission
against the illicit traffic; and there can be no doubt that the situation on the main-
land of China is the most serious and difficult aspect of the narcotic drug problem
that confronts the world today.
B. The Permanent Central Opium Board
This Board was set up by the 1925 convention, and its task under that convention
is continuously to watch the course of the international trade to prevent narcotic
drugs from escaping into the illicit traffic. The Board has broad powers of inter-
vention and may recommend an embargo on further exports of narcotic drugs to
any country if information at its disposal leads it to conclude that excessive quantities
of narcotic drugs are accumulating there or that the country is in danger of becoming
a center of illicit traffic. These broad powers of the Board are circumscribed by a
number of safeguards, however, such as the requirement of a previous demand for
explanations, the right of the country concerned to be present at the Board's dis-
cussions, the provision for notifications to all parties to the conventions and to the
Economic and Social Council, and right of the country concerned to bring the
matter before the Economic and Social Council.
The information at the disposal of the Permanent Central Opium Board consists
of annual and quarterly statistics of all drug transactions, which parties are obliged,
under the convention, to transmit to it. Nowadays, the Board also takes cognizance
of and may use annual reports submitted by governments to the United Nations and
of their reports on cases of illicit traffic.
The Permanent Central Opium Board acquired additional coercive functions un-
der the 1931 convention. In certain cases, its recommendation of embargoes, as
authorized by the i925 convention, became real embargoes which parties to the con-
vention were obligated to apply. For, if it appears from the quarterly import and
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export statistics or from certain notifications made to the Board that the quantities of
narcotic drugs exported or authorized to be exported to any country or territory
exceed the total of the estimates for that country or territory, the Board must
immediately apprise all parties to the convention, who may not then, during the
year in question, authorize any further exports to the country or territory involved,
subject to two exceptions: if the situation is regularized by supplementary estimates,
or, in exceptional cases, if the government of the exporting country considers further
exports essential in the interest of humanity or for the treatment of the sick. Other-
wise, however, there is no recourse against this embargo, either by the country
concerned or by parties to the convention; its application is quite automatic. As the
Board meets only twice a year, the secretariat is authorized to impose such embargoes
when the Board is not in session. It goes without saying, of course, that this sanction
will not be used by the Board in cases where the excess is small and probably at-
tributable to oversight or faulty accounting. Then, the Board will limit itself to
directing the attention of the country concerned to the excess and suggesting that
the excess should be covered by a supplementary estimate. It is of interest to note
that an embargo under these provisions may also be imposed by the Board against a
country which is not a party to the convention.
The second new function acquired by the Permanent Central Opium Board under
the 1931 convention was the preparation of an annual statement, on the basis of
government statistics, showing the extent to which governments have observed their
obligation to remain within their estimates. This is an annual balance sheet, showing,
on the one hand, the estimates, and on the other, the narcotic drugs consumed, manu-
factured, converted into other substances, or compounded into certain preparations,
imported, and exported. If it should appear that a party has or may have failed to
honor its obligations under the convention, the Board has the right to recommend
the imposition of an embargo against such party, in accordance with the provisions
of the 1925 convention. The statement on which the embargo is based must be
published by the Board as soon as possible, with such explanations and documents
as the Board may wish to include.
These are the main powers and functions of the Permanent Central Opium Board
which, in fact, is a semijudicial organ, passing judgment on the manner in which
governments acquit themselves of their conventional obligations and recommending
or applying sanctions in appropriate cases.
The Permanent Central Opium Board is composed of eight persons, appointed
in their personal capacity by the Economic and Social Council for five-year periods.
The 1925 convention specifies the qualifications of the members of the Board:
they shall, by their technical competence, impartiality, and disinterestedness, command
general confidence, and they must not hold any office which puts them in direct
dependence on their governments. The convention also provides that members shall,
in equitable proportions, consist of persons possessing knowledge of the narcotic drug
situation, both in producing and manufacturing countries on the one hand, and in the
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consuming countries on the other. The Board is, thus, an independent organ that
carries out the functions with which it has been charged by the 1925 and 1931 con-
ventions.
The Permanent Central Opium Board has now performed its duties for more
than a quarter of a century. It has kept strictly within its functions, as defined by
the conventions. The work, which is largely statistical, has been done painstakingly,
but cannot be very inspiring. On occasions, members have found it impossible to
attend sessions of the Board, perhaps through lack of sufficient interest. The secre-
tariat of the Board has, in some cases, assisted governments in improving their
statistical information and administrative services. This is a useful activity which
could, with advantage, be extended, subject to requests from governments.
C. The Drug Supervisory Body
The functions of the Drug Supervisory Body, which was set up by the 1931 con-
vention, have already been outlined above in the discussion of limitation of manu-
facture. The Body consists of four members, two appointed by the World Health
Organization, one by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, and one by the Permanent
Central Opium Board. The convention does not specify the qualifications of the
members, but the nature of the appointing bodies insures at least certain significant
special competences (e.g., medical knowledge and knowledge of narcotic drug
control). The annual and supplementary statements on world narcotic drug require-
ments, prepared by the Body, form the keystone of the system of limitation of manu-
facture and of quantities of manufactured narcotic drugs available in each country
and territory of the world. The work of the Body, in this connection, through the
years (it was established in 1933), has been very useful and effective. It has ac-
quired great authority and has been instrumental in reducing to reasonable pro-
portions government estimates which, for reasons of safety, have tended to exaggerate
legitimate needs-a tendency which, if unchecked, would naturally have resulted in
manufacture in excess of world requirements and in the building up of unnecessarily
large stocks that might have escaped into the illicit traffic.
The Drug Supervisory Body will assume further and similar functions in regard
to opium estimates under the 1953 protocol. But if the single convention, as pres-
ently drafted, comes into force, the Drug Supervisory Body and the Permanent
Central Opium Board will be combined into a single organ, the International
Narcotics Control Board. This attempt at simplification may not be an entirely
happy one, however, in light of the strikingly different functions of the constituent
organs. The Drug Supervisory Body determines, by its examination of estimates,
maximum permissible national and world narcotic drug totals. This, for the
Permanent Central Opium Board, is the starting point, both in its supervision of
the application of the conventions by governments and for its possible invocation of
sanctions. The International Narcotics Control Board would, thus, in a manner,
function as both prosecutor and judge.
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D. World. Health Organization
As narcotic drug addiction is a medicosocial problem, it is quite fitting and proper
that the World Health Organization should be concerned in its resolution. As has
been noted, it appoints one member of the Drug Supervisory Body and has a very
important role to play under the 1925 and 1931 conventions and the 1948 protocol
in the mechanism for putting new narcotic drugs under control or removing them
from control. It has a special drug section in its secretariat and carries out its
investigations through an expert committee on drugs liable to produce addiction. It
will, in the future, be concerned with the revision of the list of drugs falling under
the international narcotic drug treaties and has, for this purpose, enlisted the help
of a small group of experts.
Another important task of the World Health Organization is the establishment,
in cooperation with governments, of international nonproprietary names of narcotic
substances. As a rule, narcotic drugs are placed on the markets with fancy and
unintelligible names given them by manufacturers or wholesalers. More often than
not, the name does not reveal the fact that the drug is a narcotic substance, and there
is a grave risk of such drugs being used unwittingly, without the necessary safe-
guards. Its procedure, in this connection, is, however, rather slow, and the Com-
mission on Narcotic Drugs, at its last session, instituted an investigation for evolving
an alternative or supplementary procedure that would be simpler and quicker.
The World Health Organization is, at present, also carrying out a very important
series of investigations concerning methods for curing and rehabilitating addicts, and
with its high scientific and technical standard, it is making a very useful contribution
in this area.
V
THE MA&JOR PROBLEMS OF CONTROL
A. Suppression of the Illicit Traffic
The suppression of the illicit traffic is one of the primary objectives of the cam-
paign against the narcotic drug evil, and the principal international organs devote
much attention to this matter. The Opium Advisory Committee of the League was
seriously occupied with the illicit traffic, which, in the i92o's and 30's, was formidable.
The secretariat of the League proved to the 931 conference, on the basis of statistics
of manufacture and of imports and exports, that enormous quantities of narcotic
drugs, especially heroin and morphine, had disappeared into the illicit traffic from
stocks manufactured by licensed establishments. There were other alarming dis-
closures as well. Certain governments, not parties to the 1925 convention and, thus,
not obliged to adhere to the system of import certificates and export authorizations,
had-probably in ignorance of the consequences-licensed a number of factories from
which a steady stream of narcotic drugs flowed into the illicit traffic. And infamous
traffickers in Western Europe, whose lucrative dealings had been snuffed out in
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their own countries by the vigorous application of the 1925 convention, had moved
their factories and businesses to countries where narcotic drug control was slack
or nonexistent.
The Opium Advisory Committee, nevertheless, made short shrift of all these
nefarious activities. On the basis of illicit traffic reports and information furnished
by its members, the Committee, at every session, thoroughly studied and discussed
the traffic and exposed the trends, the origin of drugs, and the methods employed.
It uncovered and put out of business the wealthy and powerfully organized interna-
tional bands of traffickers, organized close cooperation between enforcement agencies
in various countries, and repeatedly recommended heavier sentences as the only
effective deterrent. Moreover, the Committee reviewed at every session the situation
in particular countries which appeared to be either centers of illicit traffic or its
victims. In furtherance of this activity, there was a permanent subcommittee on
illicit traffic, where the detailed discussion took place and where many countries
participated with their specialists.
Finally, a special international convention was prepared and concluded at a con-
ference in Geneva in 1936, for the suppression of the illicit traffic in dangerous drugs.
Its main purpose was to organize close international cooperation against illicit traffic
and to provide sufficiently severe penalties for offenses (e.g., imprisonment or other
penalties of deprivation of liberty, fines, and confiscation of drugs and instruments
-for instance, aeroplanes and motor cars-used by traffickers). Similar penalties
applied to intentional participation, conspiracy attempts, and preparatory acts, and
there were further provisions designed to punish offenders who engaged in illicit
traffic in countries other than the ones in which they resided. The convention made
extradition obligatory, with retroactive effect, and directed that each party establish
a central office for the suppression of the illicit traffic, which should keep close
contact and correspond directly with the central offices of other countries. This
convention, however, has not, so far, had the same general application as the previous
conventions. Only twenty-two countries have become parties, the explanation prob-
ably being that many states with negligible or nonexistent illicit narcotic drug
traffic have not felt it incumbent on them to ratify a convention that would involve
them in complicated legislation and administrative measures.
The United Nations has continued the campaign against the illicit narcotic drug
traffic along the same general lines as did the League of Nations. Although this
traffic remains very active in many parts of the world-the most important centers
today being the Near and the Far East-the Commission on Narcotic Drugs has not,
unfortunately, dealt with it as effectively and as ruthlessly as did the Opium Advisory
Committee. There has been a discernible tendency to soft-pedal criticism in order
to save the national pride of certain governments; there has not been the same
frank publicity concerning unsatisfactory conditions. The United Nations, in fact,
no longer functions as clearing house for uncovering and pursuing the illicit narcotic
drug traffic, a task that has largely been assumed by the International Criminal Police
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Commission, of Paris, an international government organization for the suppression
of fraud and criminality. This latter commission operates in close collaboration with
the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, however, and attends its discussions on illicit
traffic.
B. Narcotic Drug Addiction
Drug addiction, its prevention and cure, has not, as yet, received the international
attention it deserves. Neither the League nor the United Nations has progressed very
far in this field, except, incidentally, as a by-product of activities designed to prevent
narcotic drugs from reaching the addict. Addiction is a medicosocial problem, closely
connected with the economic and social conditions under which people live and
work. Apart from mitigating predisposing economic and social conditions, however,
there are other techniques for inhibiting addiction, the most significant of which is
education. But antinarcotics education has been banned both by the League and by
the United Nations, except in countries where addiction is adjudged a serious problem
and among the medical and paramedical professions. Few countries, however, are
willing to admit that domestic drug addiction constitutes a serious problem and. the
argument is also raised that antinarcotics education may draw to the subject the
attention of those who may previously have been unaware of the narcotic drug
problem and who may subsequently be tempted to try drugs out of curiosity. Such
cases may, of course, conceivably occur, but even so, they would hardly counter-
balance the number of potential narcotic drug users who might be saved if they were
fully apprised of the fateful results of addiction.
The existing international attitude towards this problem is obsolete, particularly
in the more developed countries, where the standards of living and education and,
therefore, also the sense of responsibility are constantly rising. Accordingly, this is
a problem concerning which the Commission on Narcotic Drugs should institute a
thorough inquiry by an expert committee, composed not only of narcotic drug
specialists, but also physicians, educators, and social workers.
The extent of drug addiction is not known, partly because addiction is a secret
vice, and partly because the ethics of the medical profession in many countries do not
permit revealing or reporting cases of addiction to the authorities. The estimate of
the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, which certainly cannot be regarded as other
than conservative, was expressed in the following terms in its report to the Economic
and Social Council for its 1956 session: "Drug addicts in the world today still amount
to many millions. Established figures of the number of addicts to opium, cannabis,
and coca leaves, show millions of addicts to each of them, and addicts to manu-
factured drugs must be reckoned at at least hundreds of thousands." In this connec-
tion, it should be mentioned both that nonmedical or quasimedical use of opium, can-
nabis, or coca leaves, is still permitted or tolerated in certain countries, and that opium
smoking and opium eating were only outlawed by the 1953 protocol. The protocol
allows a period of transition which may not extend more than fifteen years beyond
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its effective date. It is to be expected that the projected single convention, with a
similar transitional period, will prohibit the nonmedical use of cannabis and coca
leaves. It is, however, to be feared, that practical application of these policies will
not reach full fruition for many years to come.
Recently, extended consideration has been given in the United States to the
suggestion that the problem of drug addiction can satisfactorily be resolved by so-
called narcotics clinics, where gradually reduced doses of narcotic drugs would be
administered to addicts under medical supervision. This technique was tried in
the 1920's, however, and abandoned as a complete failure; and to revive and re-
institute it now would be a gravely retrogressive step. It would serve only to main-
tain addiction and enrich the illegal traffickers from whom the addict would continue
to procure the balance of his narcotic drug requirement. Past experience testifies
amply to the fact that a cure of narcotic drug addiction is possible only in closed
institutions, where the patient is completely shut off from the outside world. The
suggested clinics-in fact, any ambulatory method of treatment-would be fatal to
this end. I
In the meantime, addiction remains a very serious problem, and more attention
clearly should be devoted by the principal international organs to its elimination.
Governments are now, of course, in their annual reports, supplying the Commission
on Narcotic Drugs with many types of information regarding addiction-e.g., num-
ber, age groups, professions, drugs used-and this is, no doubt, interesting and useful.
But the Commission cannot thus be expected ever to obtain accurate information
concerning the extent and nature of addiction. The World Health Organization,
however, is studying, through a group of experts methods of medical treatment and
rehabilitation of addicts, and these studies may ultimately lead to more useful results.
The curing of addicts is, in most cases, possible, but without rehabilitation measures
and close supervision, most addicts will relapse into their old ways on return to their
normal lives in their habitual surroundings. Rehabilitation and after-care is, there-
fore, an essential aspect of effectively coping with addiction.
C. Limitation of Raw Materials
As long as there is an abundant supply of raw materials that may be used for
narcotic purposes or from which narcotic drugs may be manufactured, and as long
as there is a demand for illicit narcotic drugs, there will always be supplies for the
illicit traffic and for the addict. The suppression of the demand is still a long way
off, and so it has become all the more imperative either to devise methods for the
limitation of production of raw materials to the world's medical and scientific needs
or to establish such stringent controls that no supplies will escape into the illicit
traffic. This problem has engaged the attention, first, of the League of Nations,
then, of the United Nations, for more than twenty-five years. A satisfactory solution
has not yet been found, although, as far as opium is concerned, the 1953 protocol
represents a forward step. Efforts so far have primarily been concentrated on raw
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opium for two reasons: First, addiction to opium and its derivatives (morphine,
heroin, etc.) is the most widespread in the world. Secondly, the opium poppy
does not grow wild, but must be cultivated to produce opium-while both the coca
leaf and cannabis grow wild-thus affording more promising possibilities for an
effective limitation and control.
i. Raw Opium
The principal opium producers in recent years have been India, Iran, Turkey, the
Soviet Union, and the mainland of China, although Iran has, by a law promulgated
in 1955, prohibited all further poppy cultivation and opium production. Smaller
quantities have also regularly been produced in Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Greece, Japan,
Pakistan, and Yugoslavia. The opium poppy is also cultivated extensively for its
seeds, particularly in a number of East European countries. The production of
opium requires two conditions which, in fact, limit the areas where it can profitably
be pursued: a reasonable certainty of good weather at the time of harvest, as rain may
wash away the whole crop; and, as each poppy head must be treated by hand at
least twice, an abundant supply of cheap labor.
Reference already has been made to the fact that the Opium Advisory Committee
of the League of Nations, in 1940, had prepared a draft convention for the limitation
of opium production to the world's medical and scientific needs. Unfortunately,
however, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, in approaching this problem, chose
to disregard the League draft and addressed itself, instead, to a new scheme, the
central feature of which was an international opium organization, with a monopoly
to purchase, stock, and sell raw opium. This scheme was endorsed by the United
Nations secretariat and certain members of the Commission, but in view of both
the tense international situation and the fact that opium is an important strategic
substance, the majority of the Commission was unwilling to place in the hands of an
international monopoly the responsibility for the world's supply of opium. The
Commission, for other reasons as well, came to view the proposed monopoly with
suspicion, and in the end, after years of labor and discussion, the whole scheme
was abandoned in I952.
At this point, the representative of France outlined a more restricted proposal,
which, at the international conference in New York, became the 1953 protocol. The
protocol does not limit opium production to the world's medical and scientific needs,
although it stipulates that the use of opium shall be limited to such needs. A limita-
tion is, however, placed on the stocks that each country may maintain, whether
they are producing, drug manufacturing, or purely consuming countries. For pro-
ducing countries, the annual stocks held on December 31st of each year must not
exceed the amount of opium exported or used for the manufacture of drugs in any
two-and-one-half-year period, and production must be regulated so as not to exceed
such stocks; manufacturing countries may keep stocks corresponding to two years'
normal requirements; and consuming countries, stocks corresponding to the quanti-
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ties used during the preceding five years. Each producing country must, moreover,
commit the whole of its opium production and trade to one or more government
agencies. There are also a number of detailed rules regarding licensing of cultivators,
areas under license, collection of opium, etc. The Permanent Central Opium Board
is given various extensive powers in the supervision of the application of the protocol,
and these go far beyond its powers under the 1925 and 1931 conventions. The proto-
col gives a monopoly of producing opium for export purposes to the following seven
countries: Bulgaria, Greece, India, Iran, Turkey, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia.
It is obvious that these provisions concerning maximum stocks are very liberal
and that if they were fully exploited, world stocks of opium would exceed medical
and scientific needs several times over. The protocol thus, does not provide for a
real limitation of production to the world's medical and scientific needs. But the
protocol was initially intended to be only temporary in character, pending the drafting
and the effectuation of the single convention, which, it was hoped, would provide
for truly effective limitation. Unfortunately, however, the Commission on Narcotic
Drugs has now abandoned further attempts to effect a real limitation and has decided
simply to insert the provisions of the 1953 protocol, as such, into the draft single
convention.
It may be of interest here to review the world situation as regards opium pro-
duction. It is estimated that the world needs, for medical and scientific purposes, 500
to 6oo tons annually, and about 750 tons if the still-permitted quasi medical consump-
tion is included, as it should be, for the transitional period allowed by the 1953 proto-
col. The published statistics of the Permanent Central Opium Board show that
production, as reported to the Board, amounted in 1953 to 1,294 and in 1954 to 773
tons, respectively. The latter figure enabled the Board to state in its annual report
for 1955 that in 1954, production decreased and that licit requirements increased and
exceeded production. This statement should, however, be seen in the light of the
following facts:
i. All large producers (India, Iran, Turkey, but not the Soviet Union) reported
much smaller crops in 1954 than in 1953. This might have been attributable to a
reduction of area under cultivation (e.g., India), but more likely reflects a partial
crop failure, which is not uncommon.
2. In the same report of the Permanent Central Opium Board, there was pub-
lished a statement of the Health Minister of Iran, issued at a press conference in
Teheran, on August 4, 1955, to the effect that actual production in Iran was from
700 to 1,2oo tons a year, whereas the production reported to the Permanent Central
Opium Board was 227 tons in 1953 and 145 in 1954, respectively.
3. The Board's report makes no mention of the production on the mainland
of China, presumably because the Board receives no official statistics from the People's
Democratic Republic of China, where opium production is supposed to be illegal.
That such production exists, however, is evidenced by the proceedings of the Com-
mission on Narcotic Drugs year after year, from which it appears that production
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on the mainland of China alone may amount to as much as two to three times the
licit production of the rest of the world. A large part of this opium finds its way
into the international illicit traffic, either as raw opium or as morphine or heroin man-
ufactured on the mainland of China. Accordingly, the statement that world's licit
requirements exceed world's production is clearly misleading and dangerous, although
the figures the Board possesses may seem to furnish a justification.
The future of opium on licit world markets is not bright. Demands for non-
medical consumption will disappear within a few years if the 1953 protocol comes
into full force. Moreover, twenty to twenty-five per cent of the world's production
of morphine today is obtained by extraction from poppy straw; and the expanding
use of synthetic drugs has made further inroads into the licit demand for opium.
It is true that the consumption of opium derivatives is constantly increasing with
the extension and improvement of health services. The time may, however, come in
the near future when the world will require much less opium than it does today;
and producing countries which do not wish to feed their opium to the illicit traffic
will then have to reduce their production and replace opium with other crops. This
should be an internationally regulated process, and it is, therefore, deeply to be
regretted that the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, and, thus, also the United Nations,
has abandoned the plan of elaborating an effective scheme for limitation of opium
production.
The problem is, admittedly, not easy, as the producing countries see no justification
for sacrificing the livelihood of their peasants in favor of poppy straw and synthetic
drugs. The other side, however, is not willing to forego the use of either poppy
straw for extraction of morphine or synthetic drugs. Nevertheless, with some good
will and energy, it should be possible to arrive at a compromise between these com-
peting interests, to the benefit of humanity as a whole.
2. The Coca Leaf
Cocaine, a narcotic drug derived from the coca leaf, has not generally been con-
sidered to present a serious international problem. The Commission on Narcotic
Drugs has recently noted certain indications that cocaine addiction may be on the
increase, however, and this situation, accordingly, requires careful watching.
The c6ca bush is cultivated and also grows wild in certain South American coun-
tries-namely, Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru. There is also some cultivation in
Indonesia and on Formosa. The Permanent Central Opium Board reported world
production in 1954 to be some 13,000 tons, although only 700 tons are used annually
for medical purposes-i.e., for the manufacture of cocaine. The rest is accounted for
by quasi medical consumption-i.e., the chewing of coca leaves, a habit prevalent
among the indigenous populations of Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru.
Colombia, it should be noted, has, for some years, pursued an active policy of sup-
pressing this last-mentioned habit, and the governments of the other three countries
have declared their intention of doing likewise. Accordingly, the Commission on
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Narcotic Drugs has recently decided that production or harvesting of coca leaves
should be limited to the world's medical and scientific needs, and provisions to that
effect have been inserted in the draft single convention. These provisions are largely
modeled on those of the 1953 opium protocol.
3. Cannabis
More commonly known as Indian hemp, this is an industrial plant that is widely
cultivated for its textile fibres and its seeds. The plant contains an alkaloid (can-
nabinol) that has certain narcotic properties and is extensively used for nonmedical
consumption in many different forms. Most potent and dangerous is the resin
formed by the plant under certain climatic conditions. This resin is used in many
parts of the world, under many different names-e.g., charas, bhang, hashish,
takrouri, chiras, djamba, and esrar. On the American continent, cannabis is most
widely known as marijuana, and this substance usually contains dried leaves of the
plant, which is made up with tobacco into cigarettes. Although cannabis has very
violent effects and may cause insanity or homicidal tendencies, its nonmedical use is
still tolerated in some Asiatic countries.
The existing international drug conventions contain very little in regard to
cannabis. There are some relevant provisions in the 1925 convention, but these apply
only to the dried, flowering, or fruiting tops of the pistulate plant from which the
resin has not been extracted and to the resin itself. The international trade is con-
trolled through the import certificate and export authorization system, however, and
there are certain special prohibitions on the export of resin and its preparations.
And the 1936 convention for the suppression of the illicit narcotic drug traffic also
applies to Indian hemp, as defined in the 1925 convention.
The League of Nations devoted much interest and time to the cannabis problem.
It had a permanent subcommittee on cannabis, composed of outstanding international
experts. The United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs, however, has only
in recent years taken an active interest in cannabis-except for the illicit traffic
aspects, which come up for discussion every year-and at present deals with two
aspects of the general problem: the possibility of developing a narcotic-free strain
of the cannabis plant, and the replacement of the plant by nonnarcotic plants that
would produce similar textile fibres. The Commission is assisted in these quests
by the Food and Agricultural Organization and by various governments. Neither
of these lines of inquiry, interesting as they may be, however, appears to promise
success within the immediately foreseeable future, let alone the enormous practical
difficulties that will be encountered in trying to replace the actual hemp plant by a
narcotic-free strain or by another nonnarcotic plant. Accordingly, the Commission
has now decided to include in the single convention special provisions prohibiting
cannabis, except for the purpose of scientific research (production, trade, possession,
and use), but these will refer only to the alkaloid contained in the plant, its resin,
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and all substances containing the pharmacologically active principle of cannabis.
There is, of course, no question of limiting or controlling the cultivation of the plant.
VI
THE SINGLE CONVENTION
The need for codification of the international narcotic drug instruments is, per-
haps, now more easily understood. This idea was initiated during the days of the
League of Nations and was taken up by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs at an
early date. After many years of work and discussion, there has now been produced
a second draft that is practically complete and that was considered by the Com-
mission at its 1956 session. In this draft, however, the Commission has made no
final proposals on several points, but has, instead, inserted various alternatives.
The present text cannot, accordingly, be submitted to an international conference.
At its last session, therefore, the Commission reached two procedural decisions: first,
to communicate the second draft for observations to governments represented on the
Commission and to such other governments whose observers had taken part in
the preparation of the draft; and, secondly, to appoint a committee of five members
to meet before the next session of the Commission for the purpose of preparing,
in the light of observations of governments, a simplified draft, removing as many
of the alternatives as possible. This new draft is to be considered by the Commission
at its 1957 session.
Some members of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs have been critical of the
slow progress that has been made in formulating the single convention and have
urged greater dispatch. Other members appear somewhat disinterested, however, and
may deliberately be playing delaying tactics. Under these circumstances, therefore,
it may take another ten years before the single convention has been concluded and
brought into force.
Codification is certainly a difficult task, but not so complicated as to require
fifteen years or more work. There are two valid reasons, however, for hesitating
to push the single convention: First, there is a risk that the new convention may not
be as strict as the old instruments-i.e., in codification, important provisions may be
omitted or attenuated. For example, in 1953, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs
discovered that the text before it lacked the very important provisions for limitation
of manufacture, one of the essential features of the 1931 convention. This difficulty
is, of course, not insurmountable and may be obviated by submitting the final draft
to a special committee of narcotic drug experts and international lawyers for the
purpose of verifying the text from this point of view. Second, there is the notorious
slowness in ratification of treaties. A case in point is the 1953 opium protocol, whose
coming into force is not yet in sight after more than three years. The League of
Nations showed what could be done with determination and effort, however, when
the 1931 convention was brought into force within two years of its conclusion, and
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this despite the fact that the convention entailed a most radical departure in inter-
national law affecting the sovereignty of states. Nevertheless, it may take many
years before the single convention will have received as wide application as the
conventions of 1912, 1925, and 1931, and in the meantime, there will be nine instead
of eight international instruments, and the confusion may be worse than it is today.
Attention should be drawn to the fact that the present draft so greatly extends
and strengthens the powers of the international control organs and constitutes such
an invasion of the sovereignty of states that many states may hesitate to ratify the
convention or may find it impossible to do so because of a conflict with their own
constitutions: It may be necessary, therefore, to strike a reasonable compromise be-
tween the legitimate desire to enable international control organs to proceed effectively
with sanctions against serious violations of the convention and what is legally and
practically possible for governments to accept. Universality of application is essential,
and most governments will show good will in fulfilling their obligations. For the
exceptional cases of serious violations, the present powers of the Permanent Central
Opium Board and the attending world-wide publicity should be quite sufficient
to meet any critical situation.
VII
THE EFFICACY OF CONTROL
Through the international instruments and the work of the Opium Advisory
Committee and the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, control has been effected on a
world-wide scale. The conventions, and particularly the limitation convention of
1931, represent the first concerted attempt by governments to regulate a single in-
dustry throughout the world, from the point at which the raw materials enter the
international trade to the point at which they finally reach the legitimate consumer.
The essential elements of this control may be summed up as follows: the determina-
tion in advance of legitimate world needs; the adjustment of world manufacture
to legitimate world demand; the minute controlling of all channels of distribution,
both national and international; and the entrusting to international organs of the
task of supervising and coordinating the working of the whole machinery throughout
the world. Nothing similar or as far-reaching in international cooperation has ever
been attempted. The Assembly of the League of Nations described the limitation
convention of 1931 as embodying "a bold conception, without precedent in the
history of international relations and international law." In 1934, the League As-
sembly stated that the convention had set up "a real international administration."
Not only have governments accepted extensive and binding obligations, but they
have countenanced pervasive encroachment on their national sovereignty-and these
limitations of sovereignty have affected not only parties to the convention, but also
nonsignatory countries. Every transaction, whether it be in raw materials or manu-
factured narcotic drugs, is subject to national control of the strictest kind, and govern-
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ments, in their turn, are continuously supervised by and are responsible to the
international control organs.
The control system is unquestionably effective as far as it goes, but it must always
be remembered that its success depends ultimately on governments--on their good-
faith fulfillment of their obligations and on their administrative efficiency. The
question arises why, with the existence of this control, there still is illicit traffic and
narcotic drug addiction. The reply must be that, in the first place, as outlined earlier,
raw materials have not yet been sufficiently controlled. In the second place, despite
the efficiency of administration and control, there are always dishonest people who
are tempted by the enormous profits of the illicit traffic. The facts revealed-as
regards the production in Iran, for example-prove that despite control, raw opium
has been produced in quantities much larger than those collected by or delivered
to the government; and such raw opium almost invariably enters into the illicit
traffic. As all licensed drug factories are strictly supervised, traffickers resort to
clandestine manufacture, and the Commission on Narcotic Drugs has found that
in recent years, such manufacture usually takes place near the sources of raw ma-
terials. The third reason is that, by reason of their small bulk, narcotic drugs are
readily smuggled and easily escape the attention of police and other enforcement
officials.
The fact that illicit traffic and addiction continue is, however, no reason to con-
demn the national and international control system, without which it is certain that
illicit narcotic drug traffic and addiction would be far more widespread and would
constitute a far greater menace to the whole world. Governments and the interna-
tional organizations must, instead, continue the struggle and make every effort to
tighten the net, so as to choke off the channels through which this illicit traffic
flows and mitigate the ravages it causes.
VIII
THE FuTuRE
An attempt has here been made to describe the international narcotic drug control
system and to point out its existing weaknesses as well as its strength. To remedy
these weaknesses, the United Nations, through its appropriate organs, must undertake
a full review of the present work, procedures, and plans for the future. If such a
review is not undertaken shortly, there is great danger that the international control
machinery may hopelessly deteriorate. A new deal, a new approach, is called for,
particularly as regards the Commission on Narcotic Drugs. In view of the difficulties
experienced by the Commission in expeditiously discharging its functions, its entire
role and organization should be carefully restudied. As the Commission frequently
is frustrated by political and national interests, something should be done to neutralize
those influences. Naturally, governments could do much to alleviate the situation by
assigning to the Commission their experienced experts, with instructions to work
toward the professed common goal, ignoring, as far as possible, incidental political
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and economic considerations. One technique might be to have a special body of
independent experts prepare the work of the Commission and propose to the Com-
mission the solutions appropriate in each case. This body could be comparatively
small, and the present Permanent Central Opium Board might well operate satis-
factorily in this capacity. This would require a revision of the existing conventions,
however, and it could be accomplished by the proposed single convention. The
Board would then, of course, have to be a permanent body, and its members re-
munerated sufficiently well to guarantee their independence and impartiality.
In this last connection, the United Nations should see to it that lack of funds
does not hamper progress. The campaign against the illicit narcotic drug traffic is
costing the world millions of dollars annually in direct expenses, not to mention the
untold millions of dollars of economic loss to society entailed by the existence of
millions of addicts who are unable to work and produce effectively.
No country, be its laws ever so drastic and their enforcement ever so effective,
can alone protect itself and its people against the scourge of narcotic drugs. There is
only one way to success, and that is through effective international action and coopera-
tion-which today means through the United Nations and its organs. There is no
other alternative. The peoples of the world are, accordingly, looking to the United
Nations for a solution. It must not fail them.
